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If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual 
[gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, 
you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you 
have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything. 
—Sen. Rick Santorum1 
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 1. Alan Cooperman, Santorum Angers Gay Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 
2003, at A4 (quoting then-U.S. Senator Rick Santorum). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bigamy and polygamy are perennial participants in the parade of 
horribles organized by opponents of LGBT rights.2 To halt this 
parade, LGBT rights supporters argue that same-sex marriage is 
different from—and will not lead to—plural marriage.3 The purpose 
of this advocacy is to open the door to marriage just enough to allow 
same-sex couples to enter—and then to quickly close the door before 
any of the participants in the parade of horribles can slip in behind 
them. Notwithstanding their efforts, it seems that LGBT rights 
supporters inadvertently left the door open just a crack. 
If some commentators are correct, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) may have unwittingly recognized plural marriage in its initial 
guidance4 implementing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Windsor,5 which struck down section three of the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).6 According to these 
commentators, the IRS will now recognize any same-sex marriage 
that complies with the legal formalities of a state that permits same-
sex couples to marry, regardless of its validity in the couple’s state of 
domicile. This interpretation put a foot in the door to marriage, 
swinging the door back open and creating the possibility of dual status 
marriages—that is, ones that are invalid under state law but 
 
 2. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Liberty Counsel in Support of Respondent 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives (Merits Brief) at 
45, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390994, at *45; 
Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of Respondent 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, Addressing the Merits, and Supporting Reversal at 13–
14, 20, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 1780814, at *13–14, 20. 
 3. E.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1958 n.8, 1979–86 (2010); Jeffery L. 
Bineham, Marriage Equality Is Not a Slippery Slope, MINNPOST (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2012/10/marriage-equality-not-slippery-slope; 
William Saletan, Don’t Do Unto Others: The Difference Between Gay Marriage and 
Polygamy, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2006, 12:45 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_ 
science/human_nature/2006/03/dont_do_unto_others.html; see also Would Gay Marriage 
Lead to Polygamy?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 31, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org 
/2012/05/31/154064922/would-gay-marriage-lead-to-legal-polygamy. 
  “Plural marriage,” like “polygamy,” is a “gender-neutral term for marriages with 
multiple spouses, regardless of the gender combination.” Davis, supra note 3, at 1966. 
Because the term “plural marriage” covers marriages to multiple spouses without 
reference to a specific number, I use it here as embracing both bigamy and polygamy. 
 4. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
 5. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 2696. 
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recognized for federal tax purposes—and thus to the potential 
recognition of plural marriage under the federal tax laws. 
This essay builds upon my earlier work analyzing the 
shortcomings of the IRS’s implementation of the Windsor decision.7 
The Secretary of the Treasury promised that Revenue Ruling 2013-17 
would provide “certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing guidance” for 
same-sex couples.8 To the contrary, I have explained that the ruling 
“provides no more than the same veneer of clarity that DOMA did, 
as it leaves important questions unanswered, lays traps for the 
unwary, creates inequities, and entails unfortunate (and, hopefully, 
unintended) consequences.”9 Given the impossibility of finding a fair 
and workable solution for addressing the tax treatment of same-sex 
couples until same-sex marriage is recognized in every state, I have 
argued that the time is ripe to reconsider proposals to abandon the 
treatment of the married couple as a taxable unit in favor of an 
individual tax return filing system that recognizes and values all 
personal relationships.10 In this essay, I extend that analysis by 
explaining how ambiguity in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 opens the door 
to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes—a result that 
is as problematic as it is (in all likelihood) unintended. 
The remainder of this essay is divided into four parts. Part I 
summarizes the relevant section of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, 
explaining both my own interpretation of it and reaction to that 
interpretation (what I will refer to as the “alternative 
interpretation”). It is the alternative interpretation of the ruling that 
opens the door to recognizing plural marriage for federal tax 
purposes. Part II explains how a subset of marriages that would be 
recognized for federal tax purposes under the alternative 
interpretation would be void under state law (until such time as the 
relevant state-level defense of marriage act is repealed or ruled 
unconstitutional), creating the possibility that taxpayers might (either 
purposefully or inadvertently) enter into plural marriages that are all 
recognized for federal tax purposes even though they are all invalid 
 
 7. Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of Tax Equality, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 110 (2013), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2013/10/the-
moonscape-of-tax-equality.html. 
 8. Annie Lowrey, IRS to Recognize Gay Couples, Regardless of State Measures, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 30, 2013, at A6 (quoting Treasury Secretary Jacob 
Lew) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9. Infanti, supra note 7, at 118. 
 10. Id. at 128–29. 
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under state law (and therefore avoid state criminal prohibitions 
against plural marriage). Part III dissects the flaws in the alternative 
interpretation. It explains why the alternative interpretation is 
unlikely to withstand scrutiny when challenged and how the 
inevitable challenges will only exacerbate the uncertainty that 
continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex couples post-
Windsor. The essay then closes with brief concluding remarks. 
I.  REVENUE RULING 2013-17 
From 1996 until 2013, section three of DOMA provided that, for 
purposes of federal law, “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.”11 The practical effect of this provision was to treat 
same-sex couples as legal strangers under federal law, even if they 
were treated as married under state law. For example, for federal tax 
purposes, same-sex couples who were married under state law (or 
who had entered into legally equivalent civil unions or domestic 
partnerships) were prohibited from filing joint federal income tax 
returns,12 from transferring property to each other free of tax,13 and 
from excluding from gross income the value of fringe benefits 
provided to a spouse.14 
On June 26, 2013, a sharply divided Supreme Court invalidated 
section three of DOMA.15 The Court held that section three “is 
invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect 
to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”16 Following this 
decision, the federal government scrambled to issue guidance to 
 
 11. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2695–96 (2013). 
 12. I.R.C. § 6013 (2012). 
 13. Id. §§ 1041, 2056, 2523. 
 14. E.g., id. §§ 105(b), 106, 132(h)(1)–(2), 132(j)(4), 132(m)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 
(1960). An employee’s same-sex partner who also qualified as the employee’s dependent 
did qualify for an exclusion from gross income for certain—but not all—of these fringe 
benefits. Compare I.R.C. §§ 132(h)(1)–(2), 132(j)(4) (including only dependent children), 
with I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106; Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, 72 Fed. Reg. 
46,421 (Aug. 20, 2007) (together covering any qualifying dependent). 
 15. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (invalidating section three 
of DOMA). 
 16. Id. at 2696. 
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married same-sex couples on the application of federal law to their 
relationships.17 Departing from its past practice of issuing to same-sex 
couples only guidance with no precedential value,18 the IRS issued its 
first piece of guidance in the form of a revenue ruling.19 The IRS 
issued Revenue Ruling 2013-17 on August 29, 2013, with an effective 
date of September 16, 2013.20 
Among other things, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 purports to 
address the tax issues that mobile same-sex couples face as they 
grapple with a confusing patchwork of state laws governing 
relationship recognition.21 As of this writing, states can be divided 
into four distinct (and sometimes overlapping) categories with regard 
to the legal treatment of same-sex couples: (1) those that permit 
same-sex marriage (e.g., the District of Columbia, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Washington), (2) those that recognize legally equivalent 
relationships (i.e., civil unions or domestic partnerships) (e.g., Nevada 
and the District of Columbia, which is also a jurisdiction that permits 
same-sex couples to marry), (3) those that recognize legal 
 
 17. E.g., Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def. to Sec’ys of the Military 
Dep’ts Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness (Aug. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/docs/Extending-Benefits-to-Same-Sex-
Spouses-of-Military-Members.pdf; U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Benefits Admin. Letter No. 
13-203, Coverage of Same-Sex Spouses 1, 2 (July 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/publications-forms/benefits-administration-
letters/2013/13-203.pdf. 
 18. Past guidance has generally taken the form of private letter rulings and chief 
counsel memoranda, both of which are prohibited by law from being cited as precedent. 
I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3); see infra note 19. 
 19. See Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1987) (“Revenue Rulings 
. . . are published to provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and 
may be cited and relied upon for that purpose.”); Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A 
Collision of “Others,” 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 19 (2012) (describing the history of 
providing nonprecedential guidance). 
 20. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204; I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-72 (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Treasury-and-IRS-Announce-That-All-Legal 
-Same-Sex-Marriages-Will-Be-Recognized-For-Federal-Tax-Purposes%3B-Ruling-
Provides-Certainty,-Benefits-and-Protections-Under-Federal-Tax-Law-for-Same-Sex-
Married-Couples. The IRS will permit taxpayers to apply the revenue ruling retroactively 
in some circumstances. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204. 
 21. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202 (“There are more than two 
hundred Code provisions and Treasury regulations relating to the internal revenue laws 
that include the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘marriage’ (and derivatives thereof, such as ‘marries’ and 
‘married’), ‘husband and wife,’ ‘husband,’ and ‘wife.’ ”). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 (2014) 
6 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
relationships with more limited rights and obligations as compared to 
marriage (e.g., Colorado and Wisconsin), and (4) those that refuse to 
legally recognize same-sex marriages (e.g., Georgia, Louisiana, Texas, 
and West Virginia—notably, Nevada, Colorado, and Wisconsin also 
fall into this category even though they afford some alternative form 
of legal recognition to same-sex relationships).22 As they live in, move 
among, and travel between these states, married same-sex couples can 
divide their relationships into four distinct (and sometimes 
overlapping) categories: 
 
•  Evasive marriages. A marriage is evasive when a couple 
travels out of state to marry in order to “evade” a marriage 
prohibition in their home state. For example, a West Virginia 
same-sex couple might go to Maryland to marry, returning 
home to West Virginia after the wedding. This is an evasive 
marriage because the couple’s reason for traveling to 
Maryland was to avoid West Virginia’s ban on same-sex 
marriages.23 
 
•  Migratory marriages. A marriage is migratory when a couple 
lives and marries in one state but later moves to another. For 
example, a same-sex couple might live and marry in 
Massachusetts, but years later move to Louisiana (i.e., they 
“migrated” from Massachusetts to Louisiana).24 
 
•   Visitor marriages. A marriage is a visitor marriage when the 
couple is married and lives in one state but travels through 
 
 22. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other Relationship Recognition 
Laws (2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/ 
marriage-equality_10-2014.pdf; Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions 
(2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/ 
marriage-prohibitions_6-10-2014.pdf. In contrast to the Human Rights Campaign, I would 
not classify Colorado as a state that provides a full legal equivalent to marriage because 
Colorado prohibits same-sex couples who have entered only into civil unions from filing 
joint state income tax returns. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-15-117 (2014) (requiring 
couples in civil unions to use the same filing status for state purposes as they use for 
federal purposes); COLO. CODE REGS. § 201-2:39-22-104(1.7) (2014) (requiring state filing 
status to track federal filing status, effectively permitting same-sex couples married outside 
of Colorado but living there to file joint state income tax returns); see also Rev. Rul. 2013-
17, § 4, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204 (refusing to recognize civil unions for federal tax purposes). 
 23. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 100–02 (2006). 
 24. Id. 
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another state. For example, the migratory same-sex couple 
from Massachusetts described in the previous paragraph 
would be in a visitor marriage while driving through the states 
that lie in between Massachusetts and Louisiana on the way to 
their new home.25 
 
•   Extraterritorial marriages. A marriage is extraterritorial when 
the marital status of a couple married and living in one state is 
relevant under the law of another state even though they have 
not actually lived or traveled there. For example, returning to 
the example of the Massachusetts same-sex couple above, 
their marriage would be extraterritorial if they engaged in a 
transaction in Texas by mail or over the Internet and their 
marital status was somehow relevant to the transaction, but 
they never physically lived in or visited Texas.26 
 
In an effort to dodge the complex and thorny issues created 
when mobility intersects with the patchwork of state relationship 
recognition laws, the IRS stated in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that it 
“has determined to interpret the [Internal Revenue] Code [(Code)] as 
incorporating a general rule, for Federal tax purposes, that recognizes 
the validity of a same-sex marriage that was valid in the state where it 
was entered into, regardless of the married couple’s place of 
domicile.”27 This statement seems simple and clear on its face; 
however, based on the explanation and justification of this position, 
the IRS appears to have had in mind only one of the four different 
categories of marriages described above. The IRS seems to have 
considered only the plight of same-sex couples in migratory 
marriages—that is, the IRS was concerned only with couples who 
lived and married in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage and 
who later moved to a state that refuses to recognize same-sex 
marriages. The IRS did not explicitly consider or address the legal 
situation faced by same-sex couples in evasive, visitor, or 
extraterritorial marriages.28 
 
 25. Id. at 101–02. 
 26. Id. at 102. 
 27. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203. 
 28. Even for those in migratory marriages, the IRS only addressed the situation where 
marital status is made directly relevant by the Code (i.e., situations where the Code 
directly refers to a taxpayer being “married” or a “spouse”). Id. As I have explained 
elsewhere, the IRS did not address the choice-of-law questions that arise when marital 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. ADDENDUM 1 (2014) 
8 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
This inference finds support in the IRS’s assertion that its 
interpretation in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is “[c]onsistent with the 
longstanding position expressed in Revenue Ruling 58-66.”29 Revenue 
Ruling 58-66 conveyed the IRS’s position regarding common-law 
marriages, which, like same-sex marriages, are recognized in some 
states but not others. In Revenue Ruling 58-66, the IRS stated that it 
would recognize common-law marriages entered into in states 
recognizing those relationships and would continue to recognize those 
marriages in the case of taxpayers who enter into a “common-law 
marriage in a state which recognizes such relationships and who later 
move into a state in which a ceremony is required to initiate the marital 
relationship.”30 As described above, this is the very definition of a 
migratory marriage. In keeping with this focus on migratory 
marriages, the IRS recapitulated its position in Revenue Ruling 2013-
17 regarding same-sex marriage as fitting neatly within the framework 
of Revenue Ruling 58-66: “For over half a century, for Federal 
income tax purposes, the [IRS] has recognized marriages based on the 
laws of the state in which they were entered into, without regard to 
subsequent changes in domicile, to achieve uniformity, stability, and 
efficiency in the application and administration of the Code.”31 The 
paragraphs following this recapitulation “reinforce the impression 
that the IRS only had migratory marriages in mind when it drafted 
the revenue ruling, as these paragraphs focus exclusively on the 
advantages of a uniform approach when couples change their 
domicile by moving from state to state.”32 
Of particular relevance to this essay, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 
leaves evasive marriages (i.e., where a same-sex couple marries 
outside of their home state to evade a same-sex marriage ban) 
entirely unaddressed. Other commentators disagree with this 
interpretation—notably, without engaging the text of the revenue 
ruling at all—and maintain that the IRS did intend to cover evasive 
marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17.33 I encountered a similar 
 
status is indirectly relevant to determining tax consequences—for example, where tax 
consequences turn on the existence of a parent-child relationship. Infanti, supra note 7, at 
120–22. 
 29. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203. 
 30. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60 (emphasis added). 
 31. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203 (emphasis added). 
 32. Infanti, supra note 7, at 119. 
 33. E.g., Patricia A. Cain, Professor, Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the 
Meeting of the Pro Bono & Tax Clinics Committee of the Section of Taxation of the 
American Bar Association (Sept. 21, 2013); Will Baude, Two New Essays on Post-Windsor 
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reaction when presenting this idea to others at continuing legal 
education programs and when publishing op-ed pieces on the tax 
treatment of same-sex couples post-Windsor. Most are incredulous 
that the Obama administration would have left out any same-sex 
marriages, and, in any event, they doubt that the IRS would audit 
same-sex couples who have gone through a marriage ceremony and 
claim to be married for federal tax purposes. But what the IRS may 
have intended to say—and, interestingly, all of these reactions are 
based not on objective evidence of such an intention but on the 
individual’s projection of what the IRS intended—is not the same as 
what the IRS actually said. In addition, as I have explained elsewhere, 
those most likely to press the ambiguities in this guidance and to 
contest its validity are not IRS agents auditing same-sex couples but 
individual lesbian or gay taxpayers who are caught in tax traps that 
the IRS laid in Revenue Ruling 2013-17.34 
Even assuming that the IRS did intend to cover evasive same-sex 
marriages in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, there is still an open choice-of-
law question regarding whether, in the words of the ruling, each of 
these evasive marriages “was valid in the state where it was entered 
into,” because only same-sex marriages meeting this requirement will 
be recognized for federal tax purposes.35 The answer to this question 
will depend on whether the validity of the marriage is determined 
under the law of the place of the marriage’s celebration (which does 
recognize same-sex marriage) or under the law of the couple’s 
domicile (which does not).36 As I will show in Part II below, this 
 
Choice-of-Law Questions, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 18, 2013, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/18/two-new-essays-post-windsor-choice-law-questions/. 
 34. Infanti, supra note 7, at 122–25. 
 35. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 3, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 203. 
 36. In one case, these two may actually be the same state. Same-sex marriages 
celebrated in Utah in the interval between a U.S. federal district court decision striking 
down the state’s prohibition against same-sex marriage and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
issuance of a stay of that ruling pending appeal will be legally recognized for federal tax 
purposes but are not legally recognized in Utah. Charlie Savage & Jack Healy, U.S. to 
Recognize 1,300 Marriages Disputed by Utah, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/11/us/politics/same-sex-marriage-utah.html?_r=0. Utah 
does not consider these marriages void but refuses to legally recognize them for most 
purposes. See Evans v. Utah, No. 2:14CV55DAK, 2014 WL 2048343, at *4 (D. Utah May 
19, 2014). As described in the text below, this distinction can make a difference in the 
evasive marriage situation, but would not necessarily rule out the possibility of plural 
marriage—though criminal prohibitions against bigamy may be a hurdle. See infra note 79. 
Nevertheless, the State of Utah is currently embroiled in litigation in federal court over 
whether it may refuse legal recognition to these marriages. Evans, 2014 WL 2048343, at 
*20 (preliminarily enjoining Utah from enforcing its state ban against these marriages); 
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answer raises the possibility that the IRS might have unwittingly 
recognized plural marriage under Revenue Ruling 2013-17.37 
In considering whether evasive same-sex marriages are “valid” 
and thus recognized for federal tax purposes, the conventional choice-
of-law rules found in the Restatement (First) and (Second) of Conflict 
of Laws might very well result in a court’s decision to ignore the law 
of the place of celebration and instead to defer to the law of the same-
sex couple’s domicile—that is, to the law of the state that does not 
recognize same-sex marriage.38 Applying these rules, if the evasive 
marriage “violates the strong public policy” of the couple’s state of 
domicile or is declared “void” by that state, then the marriage is 
invalid and should not be recognized for federal tax purposes under 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17.39 Again, without engaging the text of the 
ruling or considering collateral consequences, other commentators 
have argued that Revenue Ruling 2013-17 completely disregards the 
law of the couple’s domicile and requires only that the marriage be 
permitted under the laws of the place of celebration (for the 
 
Herbert v. Evans, No. 14A65, 2014 WL 3557112, at *20 (U.S. July 18, 2014) (granting a 
stay of this decision pending a final decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit on appeal). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra note 39; see also Infanti, supra note 7, at 119–20. The Windsor case itself 
involved the evasive marriage of a New York couple who went to Canada to be married 
and then returned to New York to live. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 
(2013). Importantly, however, the Second Circuit predicted that New York would have 
recognized the couple’s Canadian marriage and that the couple would, therefore, have 
been married at the time of the taxpayer’s death (i.e., the relevant time for determining 
the availability of the estate tax marital deduction). Id. at 2683; Windsor v. United States, 
699 F.3d 169, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971); see id. cmt. a 
(“The rule of this Section is concerned with what law governs the validity of a marriage as 
such, namely with what law determines, without regard to any incident involving the 
marriage, whether a man and a woman are husband and wife. . . . [T]he validity of a 
marriage as such may be exclusively involved in an action for an annulment, in an action 
for a declaratory judgment that a marriage does or does not exist and in a criminal 
prosecution for bigamy.”); id. ch. 11, intro. note (“[W]hether two persons are validly 
married is determined, wherever they may be, by the law governing the marriage (see 
§ 283).”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934) (“A marriage 
which is against the law of the state of domicil[e] of either party, though the requirements 
of the law of the state of celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere 
in the following cases: . . . marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil[e] 
makes void even though celebrated in another state.”); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith 
and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It’s Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 335 
(1997) (stating in reference to the rules in the Restatement (First) and Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws that if “the marriage is obnoxious to an important public 
policy of the domicile, then the marriage will not be valid anywhere”). 
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remainder of this essay, I will refer to this position as the “alternative 
interpretation” of Revenue Ruling 2013-17).40 Under this alternative 
interpretation, all evasive same-sex marriages would be recognized 
for federal tax purposes, unless the state of celebration had enacted 
an “anti-evasion” statute that invalidated marriages entered into by 
couples attempting to evade prohibitions in their home state.41 For 
instance, Massachusetts formerly had an anti-evasion statute that 
then-Governor Mitt Romney used to prevent some out-of-state same-
sex couples from marrying in Massachusetts.42 New Hampshire still 
has an anti-evasion statute on its books.43 In the next section, I will 
explore how the alternative interpretation might open the door to 
recognizing bigamous and polygamous same-sex marriages under the 
federal tax laws. 
II.  OPENING THE DOOR TO TAX POLYGAMY 
The possibility that plural marriages might be recognized for 
federal tax purposes is created by the significant gap between what 
would be a novel federal standard for validating marriages and a 
separate, long-standing state standard for validating marriages. An 
example will help to illustrate how this gap between state and federal 
law might open the door to plural marriages, and it will also provide a 
vehicle for exploring the potential consequences of disconnecting 
state and federal law regarding the determination of marital status. 
For this purpose, I will use the example of a hypothetical same-sex 
couple from Pennsylvania—a state that only began to recognize same-
sex marriages on May 20, 2014.44 Prior to that date, Pennsylvania was 
bordered on three sides by states that permitted same-sex couples to 
 
 40. See supra note 33. 
 41. See supra note 33. 
 42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11–13 (2008), repealed by Act of July 31, 2008, ch. 
216, § 1, 2008 Mass. Acts 1014; see Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 
651–52 (Mass. 2006) (upholding the application of sections 11–13 to nonresident same-sex 
couples prior to their repeal). 
 43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:44 (2007). 
 44. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (holding the 
Pennsylvania defense of marriage act unconstitutional); Kate Giammarise & Gideon 
Bradshaw, No Appeal of Gay Marriage Ruling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 22, 
2014, http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2014/05/21/Corbett-won-t-appeal-
ruling-to-allow-same-sex-marriage/stories/201405210178 (indicating that Governor 
Corbett of Pennsylvania decided not to appeal the ruling because of the slim chance of 
success on appeal). 
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marry45 and was in close proximity to others, which made entering 
into evasive marriages relatively easy. Our hypothetical Pennsylvania 
couple will be assumed to have traveled to New York to marry in late 
2011 and to have returned to Pennsylvania after the wedding to make 
their home there.46 
This example will allow us to consider both: (1) how the gap 
between these federal and state standards for determining the validity 
of a marriage would have operated during the time that Pennsylvania 
refused to recognize same-sex marriages;47 and (2) the potential 
implications following Pennsylvania’s recognition of same-sex 
marriages for those who might have taken advantage of, or 
inadvertently fallen into, this gap. As discussed in Part II.D below, 
same-sex couples from Pennsylvania who entered into evasive 
marriages are not the only ones who might have taken advantage of, 
or fallen into, this gap. A similar gap continues to exist between the 
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and the 
standards for determining the validity of evasive same-sex marriages 
under the laws of several other states.48 
I will begin the discussion of this example by considering the 
legal treatment of the couple’s evasive New York marriage prior to 
the time when Pennsylvania began to recognize same-sex marriages, 
analyzing its legal treatment first for federal tax purposes under the 
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 and then under 
state law. Following that discussion, I will consider the possibility that 
either or both members of this couple might have married 
additional—or alternative—same-sex partners and have had those 
marriages recognized for federal tax purposes, too. I will conclude the 
discussion of this example by considering the ramifications on such 
plural marriages of the recent federal court decision striking down the 
Pennsylvania defense of marriage act as unconstitutional. 
 
 45. Prior to Whitewood, same-sex marriage was legally recognized in Delaware, 
Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and 
Other Relationship Recognition Laws (2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/marriage-equality_10-2014.pdf. 
 46. New York allowed same-sex couples to marry beginning on July 24, 2011. 
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, § 3, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws 749–50 (McKinney) (codified at 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b, 13 (McKinney 2011)). 
 47. And, given the IRS’s position in Revenue Ruling 2013-17 that taxpayers can apply 
that ruling retroactively to open taxable years, this period would extend back several years 
before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 
2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204. 
 48. See infra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
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A. Legal Treatment Before the Fall of the State Defense of Marriage 
Act 
1.  Federal Tax Treatment 
Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, 
the Pennsylvania couple’s New York marriage would be recognized 
for federal tax purposes from its inception so long as it was lawful in 
New York. Assuming for purposes of this discussion that the marriage 
did meet New York’s legal requirements, the same-sex couple would 
have been treated as married for federal tax purposes from 2011 
onward.49 
2.  State Law Treatment 
For purposes of determining the validity of an evasive marriage 
entered into by Pennsylvania residents, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has adopted and applied section 283 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.50 According to section 283(2) of the 
Restatement, “[a] marriage which satisfies the requirements of the 
state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be 
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another 
state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage at the time of the marriage.”51 
In Estate of Lenherr,52 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied 
this rule in determining whether a decedent’s estate was entitled to 
the marital exemption under the state inheritance tax. Leo and Sarah 
Lenherr had been married for nearly forty years when Leo passed 
away.53 Leo and Sarah had each been married before, and their 
former spouses had divorced them on the grounds that they had 
committed adultery (with each other).54 Following their divorces, the 
Pennsylvania couple married in West Virginia and returned to 
 
 49. Under my interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, whether an evasive marriage 
such as this New York marriage is recognized for federal tax purposes would always 
depend on whether it is valid under the appropriate state’s law, as determined under 
relevant choice-of-law rules. Thus, my interpretation of the ruling coincides with the 
general treatment of marriage validity under state law, as discussed in Part II.A.2 infra. 
 50. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa. 1974). 
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (emphasis 
added). 
 52. In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1974). 
 53. Id. at 257. 
 54. Id. at 256–57. 
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Pennsylvania to live.55 The question in the case was whether the 
couple would be treated as married under Pennsylvania law at Leo’s 
death, allowing property that was jointly owned by the couple with a 
right of survivorship to pass free of inheritance tax to Sarah.56 
It was conceded that the couple’s marriage was valid under West 
Virginia law.57 However, the couple had married in West Virginia to 
avoid a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited a husband or wife who 
was guilty of the crime of adultery from marrying “ ‘the person with 
whom the said crime was committed during the life of the former wife 
or husband.’ ”58 A separate statute prohibited the issuance of a 
marriage license in Pennsylvania to an individual who was divorced 
on grounds of adultery and wished to marry the person with whom he 
or she had committed adultery.59 Although Leo and Sarah had been 
divorced on grounds of adultery, neither had been convicted of the 
crime of adultery.60 Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
concluded that the adjudication of adultery in the context of Leo’s 
and Sarah’s divorces was sufficient to trigger both statutes.61 This set 
up a direct conflict between Pennsylvania and West Virginia law and 
required the court to decide which state’s law would apply for 
purposes of determining the validity of the couple’s marriage.62 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that there is a strong 
policy in favor of uniformity in the recognition of marriages but, at 
the same time, observed that each state has the authority to create its 
own marriage laws and “those laws and procedures should not be 
circumvented by the sham of travelling to a nearby less stringent 
jurisdiction.”63 In applying section 283 of the Restatement, the court 
had “no trouble concluding that Pennsylvania has the most significant 
relationship to the spouses and the marriage.”64 The only real 
question for the court was whether the policy behind the 
 
 55. Id. at 257. 
 56. Id. at 256. 
 57. Id. at 257. 
 58. Id. (quoting Act of June 17, 1971, P.L. 169, No. 16, § 1, amending Act of March 13, 
1815, P.L. 150, § 9, 48 P.S. § 169 (Supp. 1973–74), repealed by 1972 Pa. Laws, Act No. 334, 
§ 5). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 256–57. 
 61. Id. at 257. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 258. 
 64. Id. 
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Pennsylvania statutes that prohibited the couple’s marriage was “so 
strong that it must be given extraterritorial effect.”65 
In considering this question, the court found “that the strength of 
the policy behind [the statute] depends to a significant degree upon 
the incident of marriage under consideration.”66 According to the 
court, an incidents-based analysis was appropriate because the 
legislature itself had provided that the statutory bar to remarriage by 
adulterers would not extend to all incidents of marriage.67 The court 
determined that the policy behind the statutory bar was not to 
penalize the adulterers but to protect the sensibilities of their former 
spouses as well as the “‘moral sense of the community.’”68 Though the 
court admitted that the policy behind the statute might be “quite 
strong with respect to cohabitation and many other incidents of 
marriage,” it concluded that denying the marital exemption from 
inheritance tax would neither deter adulterous conduct nor spare the 
feelings of the former spouses.69 Balancing the “illusory gain” from 
enforcing the statutory bar against the purpose of the inheritance tax 
exemption to recognize that property held with right of survivorship 
is the product of joint effort as well as the policy in favor of 
uniformity in the recognition of marriages, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court “decline[d] to apply Pennsylvania law to invalidate this 
marriage for this purpose.”70 
Applying this analysis to the hypothetical New York marriage 
entered into by our Pennsylvania same-sex couple, the Pennsylvania 
courts would likely determine that Pennsylvania had the most 
significant relationship to the couple at the time of the marriage—a 
conclusion that would not only be consistent with Estate of Lenherr 
but also with other precedent applying the rule in section 283 of the 
Restatement.71 The Restatement also explains that the first step in the 
analysis under section 283(2) is to determine whether there is a state 
statute that “invalidate[s] in specified circumstances the out-of-state 
marriage of local domiciliaries. If the marriage comes within the 
 
 65. Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. The court observed that the statutory bar did not affect the legitimacy of 
children. Id. 
 68. Id. at 259 (quoting In re Stull’s Estate, 39 A. 16, 18 (Pa. 1898)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 reporter’s note to 
cmt. k & app. (1971 & Supp. 2013) (collecting relevant precedent). 
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provisions of such a statute, it is clear that it would be held invalid in 
the state of most significant relationship and the forum will hold it 
invalid likewise . . . .”72 In contrast to the situation in Estate of 
Lenherr, where there was no statute that invalidated the marriage and 
where it was left to the court to ascertain the policy behind the statute 
and the relative strength of that policy,73 the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly was more direct and categorical in both its invalidation of 
evasive same-sex marriages and its statement of the strength of the 
policy behind that invalidation. Before it was struck down as 
unconstitutional, the relevant portion of the Pennsylvania defense of 
marriage act read: 
It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public 
policy of this Commonwealth that marriage shall be between 
one man and one woman. A marriage between persons of the 
same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign 
jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in 
this Commonwealth.74 
Because the General Assembly declared this category of 
marriages “void” and clearly articulated a “strong and longstanding 
 
 72. Id. Regarding the potential countervailing considerations that might exist, the 
Restatement explains: 
The time of the bringing of the action which questions the validity of the marriage 
may have an important bearing upon whether a strong policy of the state of most 
significant relationship is involved. If the action is brought at a time when both 
spouses are still domiciled in that state, the interest of that state in the spouses is 
apparent and its strong policy may be involved in the circumstances discussed 
above. The situation may well be different, however, if the action involving the 
validity of the marriage is brought at a time when both of the spouses have moved 
from the state. 
Id. (emphasis added). In the situation posited here, where the couple returns to and 
remains in Pennsylvania following the New York marriage, these countervailing 
considerations would not exist. See id. 
 73. Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d at 257, 258–59. Moreover, the Lenherr court’s 
incidents analysis is not relevant to the instant situation because the General Assembly did 
not carve out any incidents of marriage from the statutory prohibition against same-sex 
marriage. See infra text accompanying note 744. The question here does not relate to 
whether it was inoffensive to treat a couple as married for a discrete purpose under state 
law; rather, it is whether the couple was married for all purposes under state law. 
Possessing one or more incidents of marriage is not sufficient for a couple to be treated as 
married for federal tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, § 4, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204. It 
would be difficult for the IRS to argue otherwise when it refuses to recognize domestic 
partnerships and civil unions for federal tax purposes—even if they possess all of the 
incidents of marriage. Id. 
 74. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2013). 
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public policy” against same-sex marriage, it appears that an evasive 
marriage entered into by a Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have 
been held invalid prior to the fall of the state’s defense of marriage 
act in May 2014.75 
Furthermore, a void marriage in Pennsylvania is a marriage that 
never existed at all—regardless of whether either party to the 
marriage ever sought an annulment.76 Indeed, “[i]t has been held that, 
as a void marriage is a nullity, the innocent party is free to marry 
again without any prior decree of annulment.”77 Therefore, our 
hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple would have been left with 
a marriage that did not exist under state law but that would 
 
 75. See In re May’s Estate, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953) (using the law of the place of 
celebration to determine the validity of an evasive marriage of New York residents 
because a New York law voiding incestuous marriages did not have specifically 
extraterritorial application—as the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act did—and, under 
the circumstances, the natural law exception did not apply); Godfrey v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 
328, 337–40 (N.Y. 2009) (Ciparick, J., concurring) (applying the rule announced in May’s 
Estate and asserting that evasive same-sex marriages would be recognized in New York 
because of the lack of a specific statute voiding out-of-state same-sex marriages and 
because the natural law exception does not apply); see also Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. 
Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 645 (Mass. 2006) (Spina, J., concurring) (deferring to the 
“paramount interest” of the state of a couple’s domicile in upholding the constitutionality 
of a now-repealed reverse evasion statute); KOPPELMAN, supra note 23, at 88 (describing 
the Restatement approach and stating that “[t]he disfavored form of marriage could not 
validly be celebrated in the forum state, and domiciliaries of the forum could not enter 
into that sort of marriage anywhere”); Strasser, supra note 39, at 337 (“Arguably, when a 
legislature declares a marriage void rather than merely prohibited, the state demonstrates 
that there is a strong public policy against such marriages and that such marriages, even if 
validly contracted elsewhere, should not be recognized by the state” (footnotes omitted)); 
see also supra note 39. 
 76. See Commonwealth ex rel. Knode v. Knode, 27 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1942); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C.5th 558, 563, 576 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Berks County 2010) 
(holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce to a same-sex 
couple; in dicta, the court, without citing any authority or engaging in any legal analysis, 
speculated that an evasive marriage—though void in Pennsylvania—might be valid in a 
state that recognizes same-sex marriage, but the court later indicated that the same-sex 
couple was not left without a remedy because they should have been able to obtain an 
annulment from the Pennsylvania courts, see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304(b) (West 
2013)); see also Surnamer v. Ellstrom, No. 1 CA–CV 11–0504, 2012 WL 2864412, at *2 
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 12, 2012) (finding that granting an annulment to a couple who had 
entered into an evasive same-sex marriage would be consistent with the marriage’s 
treatment as void under Arizona law, because the annulment would not require the 
recognition of the marriage but rather constitute an affirmation of its invalidity). 
 77. Faivre v. Faivre, 128 A.2d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956); see also Commonwealth 
ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 279 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971); LaVigne v. Wise, 43 Pa. D. 
& C.4th 225 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Monroe County 1999). 
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nevertheless have been recognized for federal tax purposes under the 
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. 
B. Possibility of Plural Marriage 
Given the invalidity of this evasive marriage and Pennsylvania’s 
treatment of void marriages as nullities, it seems that nothing would 
have prevented this couple from entering into additional marriages. 
Two different scenarios come to mind in which the couple might have 
wished to enter into additional marriages: 
 
•  Serial monogamy. If the Pennsylvania couple ended their 
relationship following their New York marriage, they might 
have relied on the invalidity of their first marriage to enter 
into a later marriage (or marriages) with a new same-sex 
partner(s). The couple might have done this because they 
could not obtain a divorce from a Pennsylvania court, did not 
wish to establish residency in New York for at least one year 
to be able to divorce there, or did not want to incur the 
significant expense of hiring a lawyer to test the legal waters 
regarding the availability of an annulment in Pennsylvania.78 
 
•  Purposeful plural marriage. Or, if the couple were in an 
“open” relationship, they might have decided to take 
advantage of the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 
2013-17 by marrying other parties to the relationship, too. 
From a federal tax perspective, there are a variety of reasons 
why the couple might have done this. For instance, the couple 
might have wished to expand the marital unit to include 
additional parties to the relationship in order to be able to 
transfer property among all of themselves free of tax—or 
merely to avoid the uncertainties entailed with the sharing of 
finances outside of a legally recognized marriage.79 
Alternatively, if both members of the married same-sex 
couple had adequate health insurance from their employers 
(i.e., neither one needed to be added as a spouse to the other’s 
insurance), they might have wished to marry other parties to 
 
 78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney 2014); see supra note 76. 
 79. See supra note 13; see also Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as 
Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 783–803 (2004) (describing the federal tax 
uncertainties surrounding the sharing of finances by unmarried individuals). 
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the relationship who had to pay for their own health insurance 
in order to add them to their employer-provided coverage on 
a tax-free basis.80 
 
It would have been possible for the same-sex couple to enter into 
additional marriages because their New York marriage would have 
been invalid both within and without Pennsylvania at that time. In 
other words, it should have been as if the marriage never existed. 
Thus, either or both of the same-sex spouses in this couple would 
have been free to marry another person without the need for a 
judicial declaration of annulment.81 For example, one spouse might 
have gone to Maryland to enter into an evasive same-sex marriage 
with a third Pennsylvania resident in early 2013,82 and the other 
spouse might have gone to New Jersey to enter into an evasive same-
sex marriage with a fourth Pennsylvania resident later in 2013.83 Due 
to the invalidity of the New York marriage, neither of these 
subsequent same-sex marriages would have been bigamous at the 
time they were entered into.84 Indeed, both the Maryland and New 
Jersey marriages would have been invalid for the same reasons that 
 
 80. See supra note 14. 
 81. Cf. Op. Att’y Gen. No. L-06 (N.D. 2013), available at 2013 WL 6593427 (opining 
that a party to a valid same-sex marriage may legally enter into a different-sex marriage in 
North Dakota without first dissolving the same-sex marriage and without risking criminal 
prosecution; however, no opinion was expressed regarding the treatment of the different-
sex marriage under the laws of the state where the same-sex marriage was entered into). 
 82. Maryland began to permit same-sex couples to marry on January 1, 2013. See Jean 
Marbella, This Is Another Step in Being Treated Equally, BALT. SUN, Dec. 7, 2012, at 1A 
(indicating that “Gov. Martin O’Malley officially confirmed the passage of the same-sex 
marriage referendum” by the state’s voters). 
 83. New Jersey began to permit same-sex couples to marry on October 21, 2013. See 
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336, 369 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) 
(mandating that New Jersey extend the right to marry to same-sex couples); Salvador 
Rizzo, Christie Ends Legal Battle Against Gay Marriage, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), 
Oct. 22, 2013, at 1 (indicating that Governor Christie had decided not to appeal the 
decision in Garden State Equality). 
 84. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-502(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (“While lawfully 
married to a living person, a person may not enter into a marriage ceremony with 
another.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-1(a)(4) (West 2012) (stating that a married person is 
not guilty of bigamy when he “reasonably believes that he is legally eligible to remarry”); 
Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 975–76 (Md. 2012) (applying a rule similar to section 283(2) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws for purposes of determining the validity of a 
marriage); Wright v. State, 81 A.2d 602, 605 (Md. 1951) (“[I]t is a good defense to an 
indictment for bigamy that the first marriage was void, since bigamy can be committed 
only by the marriage of a person already married.”); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65, 
68 (N.J. 1958) (applying a rule similar to that of Pennsylvania with respect to evasive 
marriages). 
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the New York marriage was.85 Accordingly, from a state law 
perspective, none of these couples would have been considered 
“married” at all, let alone married multiple times. Yet, under the 
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, all three of 
these marriages would have been recognized for federal tax purposes 
because all that would matter under that interpretation would be 
whether each marriage was permissible under the law of the place of 
celebration—regardless of its actual validity.86 
At first blush, it might seem odd that the state of celebration in 
each of these cases would be ignoring the prior marriage on the 
ground that it was invalid but then would be allowing one of the 
parties to that marriage to enter into another, similar marriage that 
was likewise invalid. But it would only be odd if the state were 
actually making a legal determination regarding the validity of these 
marriages prior to issuing a license. In practice, little or no legal 
vetting usually takes place before issuing a marriage license—a reality 
that is leveraged here by having the marriages take place in three 
different states. For example, when I emailed the New Jersey 
Department of Health to determine whether any legal vetting takes 
place in that state, I received the following response: “The local 
Registrars do not check any records to verify previous marriages 
when they take an application. The applicants sign the application to 
verify that they have provided honest and accurate information. They 
are liable if they [sic] information is fraudulent.”87 Questions about 
 
 85. See supra note 844 and Part II.A. 
 86. It might also have been possible for each of the parties to the New York same-sex 
marriage to enter into a single different-sex marriage without running afoul of criminal 
prohibitions against bigamy or polygamy. See supra note 811. 
 87. E-mail from records@doh.state.nj.us, to Anthony C. Infanti, Senior Assoc. Dean 
for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Jan. 6, 2014, 
08:34 AM EST) (on file with author); see E-mail from Guy R. Warner, N.Y. State 
Registrar, Dir., Vital Records, to Anthony C. Infanti, Senior Assoc. Dean for Academic 
Affairs & Professor of Law, Univ. of Pittsburgh Sch. of Law (Jan. 6, 2014, 09:18 AM EST) 
(“Marriage licenses are issued by local municipal clerks. They do not check records of 
marriages, deaths, etc. before issuing the license.”) (on file with author); see also Bride 
Accused of Stealing Dead Woman’s ID, NEWS JOURNAL (Wilmington, Del.), Dec. 6, 2007, 
at B3 (reporting that a individual used deceased relative’s identification to marry in 
Delaware, likely because the state reportedly performs no records check prior to issuing a 
marriage license); Susannah Cahalan & David Seifman, I.D.-Thief Wedding Crushers: 
Forgery Nightmare Turns Brides into “Bigamists,” N.Y. POST, Aug. 26, 2007, at 5 
(describing how individuals were denied marriage licenses on the ground that they were 
already married in the state (in some cases multiple times), when the earlier marriages 
were fraudulently entered into by individuals who had stolen their identities); David 
Doege, Woman Pleads Guilty to Identity Theft, Bigamy Using Aunt’s Name, MILWAUKEE 
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the validity of a marriage are thus normally left to be sorted out 
sometime after the wedding day (hence many of the cases cited in this 
essay). 
Thus, whether our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple 
entered into multiple marriages with the purpose of achieving legal 
recognition for an open relationship under the federal tax laws or 
merely to memorialize their serial monogamy, the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 would seem to treat the 
marriages the same. That is, all three of these marriages would be 
recognized for federal tax purposes and, in turn, our four 
Pennsylvania residents would be federally recognized bigamists or 
polygamists. Accordingly, the parties to these marriages would have 
been required to file plural joint federal income tax returns—a 
practically difficult task given that the joint return is designed to be 
filed only by those in dyadic marriages—or, if all of the parties were 
not agreeable to filing jointly (which is highly probable in the serial 
monogamy scenario), they would have been required to use the 
generally disadvantageous married filing separately status on their 
returns.88 
C. Ramifications of Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage 
On May 20, 2014, a federal district court issued a decision 
striking down the Pennsylvania defense of marriage act on 
constitutional grounds—a decision with immediate effect that the 
Governor of Pennsylvania chose not to appeal.89 Because at least one 
set of plaintiffs in the case had entered into an evasive marriage,90 the 
court’s ruling clearly addressed the legal treatment of same-sex 
marriages previously entered into outside of Pennsylvania and 
specifically conferred legal recognition on those relationships.91 This 
legal development raises further interesting questions and issues 
regarding the interaction of state and federal law for couples who 
enter into multiple marriages, whether of the purposefully plural or 
 
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 3, 2002, at B5 (reporting that one woman married two different 
men within months using two different identities). 
 88. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), (d), 6013 (West 2012). For a description of the disadvantages of 
married filing separately status, see Infanti, supra note 7, at 122–23. 
 89. See supra note 44. 
 90. Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 416 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 91. Id. at 413 (“By virtue of this ruling, same-sex couples who seek to marry in 
Pennsylvania may do so, and already married same-sex couples will be recognized as such 
in the Commonwealth.”). 
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the serially monogamous variety. Again, the discussion of the legal 
treatment of these marriages will be discussed first for federal tax 
purposes under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 
2013-17 and then under state law. 
1.  Federal Tax Treatment 
Under the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, 
the court’s decision should have been a nonevent for federal tax 
purposes. Under that interpretation, all that matters from a federal 
tax perspective is whether the state where a same-sex couple was 
married permitted same-sex marriages at the time. 92 Because all three 
of the states where the marriages posited in our example took place 
(i.e., New York, New Jersey, and Maryland) permitted same-sex 
couples to marry when the marriages were entered into,93 all three of 
these same-sex marriages should have been, and should continue to 
be, “valid” and recognized for federal tax purposes under the 
alternative interpretation. 
2.  State Law Treatment 
From a state law perspective, however, the retroactive 
application of the federal court decision could give rise to difficult 
legal issues. If all of these marriages were now retroactively afforded 
legal recognition, then Pennsylvania would now, too, see these 
individuals as having entered into multiple marriages. As a result, 
some or all of these four individuals might have committed the crime 
of bigamy.94 There is, however, a defense to bigamy in Pennsylvania 
for those who enter into a subsequent marriage in good faith, which 
might protect the parties to these marriages from criminal 
prosecution.95 Nevertheless, a deliberate attempt to enter into 
multiple marriages to take advantage of the gap that the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 creates between federal tax 
law and state family law (as occurred in the purposefully plural 
marriage scenario) might be seen as evidence of bad faith that would 
negate such a defense. 
 
 92. See supra Part I. 
 93. See supra notes 46, 82, 83 and accompanying text. 
 94. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4301 (West 2014). Whether the other parties to the 
second and third marriages are guilty of bigamy would depend on their knowledge of the 
hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple’s first (i.e., New York) marriage. Id. § 4301(b). 
 95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(c). 
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In terms of the legal validity of the multiple marriages posited in 
our example, the legal treatment under Pennsylvania law diverges 
significantly from the federal tax treatment under the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. In keeping with its 
criminalization of bigamy, Pennsylvania permits only one marriage to 
be legally recognized at a time.96 Depending on the facts and 
circumstances, the Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be 
retroactively void as bigamous, leaving only the New York marriage 
valid.97 Alternatively, under appropriate facts and circumstances, the 
Maryland and New Jersey marriages might be legally recognized over 
the New York marriage.98 But recall that if the validity of a marriage 
under the law of the state of domicile is irrelevant under Revenue 
Ruling 2013-17, as proponents of the alternative interpretation hold, 
then the invalidation of any of these marriages under Pennsylvania 
law should not affect their recognition for federal tax purposes. Thus, 
parties to multiple marriages—whether those marriages are 
purposefully plural or merely serially monogamous—could (or 
should) continue to file plural joint federal income tax returns—or be 
relegated to the disadvantageous married filing separately status—
following the federal court decision striking down the Pennsylvania 
defense of marriage act.99 
If our hypothetical Pennsylvania same-sex couple were serially 
monogamous (rather than purposefully plural) in their marriages, 
then they might actually wish for the subsequent Maryland and New 
Jersey marriages to remain valid (rather than the initial New York 
marriage). A Pennsylvania statute could provide them with a partial 
remedy in this situation if the New York marriage is the only one that 
is otherwise to be legally recognized. That statute provides in 
pertinent part: 
If a married person, during the lifetime of the other person with 
whom the marriage is in force, enters into a subsequent 
 
 96. See infra note 100. 
 97. See In re Estate of Watt, 185 A.2d 781, 784–86 (Pa. 1962) (setting up a facts and 
circumstances test for determining which marriage will be legally recognized that stems 
from the need to resolve conflicting presumptions regarding (1) the continuance of the 
first marriage and (2) the innocence of the parties entering into the second marriage); 
Huff v. Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 40 F.3d 35, 39–42 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying Estate 
of Watt). 
 98. See, e.g., Huff, 40 F.3d at 42–43 (describing the possibility that the second 
marriage in that case might be recognized over the first and remanding the case to the 
district court to weigh the facts and circumstances). 
 99. See supra note 888 and accompanying text. 
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marriage . . . and the subsequent marriage was entered into by 
one or both of the parties in good faith in the full belief that the 
former spouse was dead or that the former marriage has been 
annulled or terminated by a divorce, or without knowledge of 
the former marriage, they shall, after the impediment to their 
marriage has been removed by the death of the other party to 
the former marriage or by annulment or divorce, if they 
continue to live together as husband and wife in good faith on 
the part of one of them, be held to have been legally married 
from and immediately after the date of death or the date of the 
decree of annulment or divorce.100 
This statute provides only a partial remedy because the 
subsequent Maryland and New Jersey marriages could not be 
retroactively validated from their inception; rather, they would be 
valid only from the date the New York marriage ended through 
divorce or annulment. It would seem that, even under the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the formal divorce or 
annulment of the first marriage should end its recognition for federal 
tax purposes—coincidentally, as of the same time the marriage would 
cease to be legally recognized under state law. However, as 
mentioned above, under the alternative interpretation, the Maryland 
and New Jersey marriages would have been recognized for federal tax 
purposes from the date of their celebration—and not just from the 
time the New York marriage ended through divorce or annulment—
creating yet further discontinuity between the federal tax and state 
law treatment of the same marriages. 
D. Not Just a Pennsylvania Problem 
This opportunity for purposeful legal arbitrage—or, 
alternatively, to inadvertently fall into a trap of legal complexity—is 
not unique to Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania is not the only state that 
has prohibited same-sex marriage, that has adopted rules similar to 
those in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws for determining the 
validity of marriages, and whose laws would allow same-sex couples 
to avoid criminal bigamy or polygamy charges because their 
relationships are legally invalid. Other states in an ostensibly similar
 
 100. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702(a) (West 2014). 
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legal position include Arkansas,101 Georgia,102 Indiana,103 Kentucky,104 
 
 101. See ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1 (“Marriage consists only of the union of one man 
and one woman.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-26-201(b) (2014) (providing that a reasonable 
belief that one is eligible to marry is an affirmative defense to a charge of bigamy); id. § 9-
11-107 (refusing to treat as valid migratory same-sex marriages); id. § 9-11-109 (“A 
marriage between persons of the same sex is void.”); State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545, 550 
(Ark. 1957) (“In the circumstances, it can hardly be said that the public policy of this State 
against under-age marriages is so strong that such a marriage, valid in the state where it 
was contracted, is void in this State.”); Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 
1986) (reaffirming Graves and stating, “We have no doubt that the Arkansas policy 
against incest is so strong that we would not recognize the validity of a marriage, even if 
performed in another state, between very close blood relatives, such as a father and 
daughter or a brother and sister.”). But see Max Brantley, Arkansas Supreme Court Stays 
Ruling Overturning Same-Sex Marriage Ban, ARK. TIMES ARK. BLOG (May 16, 2014, 4:31 
PM), http://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2014/05/16/arkansas-supreme-court 
-stays-ruling-overturning-same-sex-marriage-ban (reporting that one week after a decision 
by a state trial court judge striking down the state’s defense of marriage act on 
constitutional grounds, the Arkansas Supreme Court issued a stay of that decision pending 
appeal). 
 102. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 4, para. 1(a) (Westlaw 2014) (“Marriages between 
persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-20(b) (2013) 
(providing that a reasonable belief that an individual is eligible to remarry is a defense to 
bigamy); id. § 19-3-3.1(b) (“Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex 
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise 
shall be void in this state.”); id. § 19-3-43 (“Parties residing in this state may not evade any 
of the laws of this state as to marriage by going into another state for the solemnization of 
the marriage ceremony.”); King v. State, 40 Ga. 244, 247 (1869) (“If the first marriage 
were, for any cause, void, or if the defendant has been divorced a vinculo matrimonii, the 
second marriage is not bigamy.”); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wacht, 66 S.E.2d 757, 757–59 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1951) (finding no intent to evade marriage laws where a woman moved to 
another state, met a man there, married there, and remained there for several years before 
returning to Georgia). 
 103. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1(b) (West 2013) (“A marriage between persons of 
the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is 
solemnized.”); id. § 31-11-8-6 (rendering evasive marriages void); id. § 35-46-1-2(b) 
(providing that a reasonable belief that an individual is eligible to remarry is a defense to 
bigamy); Pry v. Pry, 75 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. 1947) (stating that “ ‘a void marriage is good 
for no legal purpose’ ” and indicating that there is no need to bring an action to declare a 
marriage void (quoting Wiley v. Wiley, 123 N.E. 252, 254 (1919)). But see Baskin v. Bogan, 
No. 1:14-cv-00355-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 2884868, at *16 (S.D. Ind. June 25, 2014), aff’d, 
2014 WL 4359059 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (striking down Indiana’s same-sex marriage ban 
as a violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution); 
Rick Callahan, Gay Marriage Ruling Put on Hold, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 16, 2014, at A5 
(indicating that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had issued a stay of its ruling 
pending appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 104. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (West 2014) (deeming same-sex marriages 
“prohibited and void”); id. § 402.040 (adopting a place of celebration rule for determining 
the validity of foreign marriages unless they are against public policy in Kentucky and 
specifying that same-sex marriages are against public policy); id. § 402.045 (declaring 
foreign same-sex marriages void in Kentucky); id. § 530.010(2) (providing that a 
reasonable belief that one is eligible to marry is a defense to a charge of bigamy); id. cmt. 
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North Dakota,105 and Virginia.106 Thus, if the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 proves correct, then there 
are several other states whose laws appear to allow individuals to 
enter into plural marriages for federal tax purposes, whether 
purposefully or inadvertently. 
III.  A FLAWED INTERPRETATION 
Adopting the alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-
17 might thus result in a profound reworking of the federal tax 
 
(indicating in appended commentary from the Kentucky Crime Commission/LRC, which 
is intended as an aid in construing the statute, id. § 500.100, that this reasonable belief 
defense aims to cover, among others, the situation where “the prior marriage was void”). 
But see Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (finding in a 
memorandum opinion that Kentucky’s constitutional amendment and statutes prohibiting 
same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution as applied 
to same-sex couples who entered into apparently evasive marriages in jurisdictions outside 
of Kentucky; unfortunately, the court’s reasoning was conceptually muddied by its 
assumption, without explanation or analysis, that these evasive marriages are in fact 
valid—like the IRS in Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the court did not seem to appreciate the 
different categories of marriages that exist or the choice-of-law issues raised by evasive 
marriages and the impact of those issues on the constitutional analysis in the opinion); 
Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (striking down the state same-sex 
marriage ban as it applies to couples wishing to marry in Kentucky, but issuing a stay of 
that decision); John Cheves, Federal Judge Grants Indefinite Delay of His Same-Sex 
Marriage Ruling in Kentucky, KENTUCKY.COM (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.kentucky.com 
/2014/03/19/3149077/federal-judge-grants-indefinite.html (granting stay of the decision in 
Bourke). 
 105. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-13(1) (2012) (criminalizing a marriage to 
“another person, while married to another person”); id. § 14-03-08 (determining validity of 
an evasive marriage by reference to North Dakota law); Johnson v. Johnson, 104 N.W.2d 
8, 13 (N.D. 1960) (same); see also supra note 811. 
 106. See VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A (“That only a union between one man and one 
woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions.”); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-363, -364 (2014) (providing an exception to the 
crime of bigamy for a person “whose former marriage was void”); id. § 20-45.2 (“Any 
marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall be 
void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights created by such marriage shall be 
void and unenforceable.”); Farah v. Farah, 429 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (“A 
marriage that is valid under the law of the state or country where it is celebrated is valid in 
Virginia, unless it is repugnant to public policy.”); Kleinfield v. Varuki, 372 S.E.2d 407, 409 
(Va. Ct. App. 1988) (“A void marriage, unlike a voidable marriage, does not require an 
action of annulment to render it void. Without obtaining an annulment, a party to a void 
marriage is free to marry again.”). But see Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. 
Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 2014 WL 3702493 (4th Cir. July 28, 2014) 
(striking down on summary judgment Virginia’s same-sex marriage ban under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution). The Supreme Court has 
issued a stay of this decision. McQuigg v. Bostic, No. 14A196, 2014 WL 4096232 (U.S. 
Aug. 20, 2014). 
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treatment of intimate relationships. To be clear, I express no opinion 
here regarding whether plural marriage ought to be recognized for 
federal tax purposes. Rather, I am merely observing that adopting an 
interpretation that would lead to the recognition of plural marriage 
would represent a sea change in the tax treatment of intimate 
relationships. In this Part, I articulate the reasons why such a sea 
change in the tax treatment of intimate relationships is unlikely to 
withstand scrutiny and why it would do no more than add to the 
uncertainty that continues to surround the tax treatment of same-sex 
couples post-Windsor. 
A. Contradictory Positions 
The alternative interpretation would cause the IRS to espouse 
contradictory positions—in the same ruling—that both reify and 
undermine the importance of marriage in its conventional, dyadic 
form. Although Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not without its internal 
contradictions,107 these two positions stand in such stark contrast that 
they call into question the alternative interpretation’s plausibility. 
Reifying the importance of “marriage,” Revenue Ruling 2013-17 
takes a rigidly formalistic approach in determining which conjugal 
relationships qualify as “marriages” for federal tax purposes. In that 
ruling, the IRS—without any explanation or justification—announced 
that it would not treat same-sex or different-sex couples in civil unions 
or domestic partnerships as “married” for federal tax purposes.108 
This position came as a surprise because, just two years earlier, the 
IRS indicated its willingness to look past labels and to treat different-
sex couples in civil unions and domestic partnerships as “married” for 
federal tax purposes so long as their legal relationships were 
equivalent to marriage under state law.109 The IRS’s newly rigid 
attachment to the label “marriage” effectively closes the door to 
 
 107. Infanti, supra note 7, at 124. 
 108. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204; see Infanti, supra note 7, at 123–25 
(explaining the reversal of position). 
 109. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, Internal Revenue 
Serv., to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), available at 2011 
TNT 215-62 (LEXIS) (“[I]f Illinois treats the parties to an Illinois civil union who are of 
opposite sex as husband and wife, they are considered ‘husband and wife’ for purposes of 
Section 6013 of the Internal Revenue Code, and are not precluded from filing jointly, 
unless prohibited by other exceptions under the Code.”). 
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recognizing alternative forms of relationships for federal tax 
purposes.110 
Yet, embracing the alternative interpretation would undermine 
the importance of “marriage” in its conventional sense by opening the 
door to plural marriage. This would represent a radical departure 
from extant social norms concerning marriage, as expressed in state 
criminal prohibitions against bigamy.111 Furthermore, in contrast to its 
position regarding civil unions and domestic partnerships, the IRS 
takes no explicit position on evasive (and, correlatively, plural) 
marriages in the ruling; rather, that position has only been inferred by 
commentators.112 It is doubtful that a sea change in the legal 
treatment of intimate relationships would come about by implication, 
especially given the IRS’s professed goal of providing certainty, 
clarity, and cohesive guidance to same-sex couples.113 Moreover, it 
would be quite odd for the same ruling, on the one hand, to 
purposefully close the door to recognizing alternatives to 
conventional, dyadic marriage that already exist under state law and, 
on the other, to implicitly embrace an alternative to dyadic marriage 
that does not yet exist under state law (and that would not be 
correlatively recognized under state law following the fall of the 
individual state bans on same-sex marriage).114 
B. Too Far, Too Fast 
Compounding the oddity of this juxtaposition of contradictory 
positions is the tax system’s complete lack of preparedness to deal 
with plural marriage. As mentioned above, I express no opinion here 
regarding the propriety of legally recognizing plural marriage. My 
purpose is far more modest—that is, to observe that the IRS could 
not legally recognize plural marriage without making changes to the 
tax system to accommodate the differences between dyadic and plural 
marriage. No such changes accompanied the issuance of Revenue 
Ruling 2013-17.115 This calls into question whether the IRS had the 
alternative interpretation in mind when drafting the ruling or, if it did, 
 
 110. Infanti, supra note 7, at 127. 
 111. See, e.g., supra notes 84–1066. 
 112. See, e.g., supra notes 321–322. 
 113. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., supra Part II.C. 
 115. Hence, the reference above to the practical difficulty of filing plural joint tax 
returns. See supra text accompanying note 888. 
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whether it actually considered or understood the consequences of that 
position. 
Through the Code, Congress imposes a federal income tax that 
applies at the national level; however, it is important to remember 
that the Code “taxes transactions whose legal effects are usually 
prescribed by state rather than federal law.”116 As a result, state family 
law underpins the federal tax treatment of intimate relationships.117 
But this underpinning falls short when it comes to plural marriage. 
Because plural marriage remains criminalized, commentators have 
not focused their energies on creating or refining a legal regime for its 
regulation.118 To fill this gap, Adrienne Davis has considered what a 
regime for recognition and regulation of plural marriage might look 
like.119 According to Professor Davis, family law is not equipped to 
deal with plural marriage and the ways in which it differs from dyadic 
marriage.120 Instead, Professor Davis suggests that commercial 
partnership law could serve as a useful starting point for developing a 
regulatory framework for plural marriage.121 Regardless, because 
family law is currently unequipped to deal with plural marriage, the 
Code lacks an underlying legal framework to which it can attach tax 
consequences. 
Tax law is in no better position than family law to deal with 
plural marriage. As Samuel Brunson has observed, “tax law . . . has 
no mechanism for dealing with polygamous taxpayers.”122 The 
qualitative and quantitative differences between dyadic and plural 
marriage render our extant joint filing system, which treats the dyadic 
married couple as a taxable unit, ill-suited to the task of appropriately 
taxing plural marriages.123 Indeed, citing the difficulties of taxing 
 
 116. BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, 
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.1.1 (2014) (emphasis added), available at 1997 WL 439503 *1. 
 117. Id. (“Without the body of state law prescribing the rights and liabilities arising 
from taxpayers’ daily activities, the federal tax collector would be a fish out of water. . . . 
[T]he Code’s reliance on state law is so pervasive that it rarely rises to the conscious 
level.”). 
 118. Davis, supra note 3, at 1957–60. 
 119. Id. at 1958. 
 120. Id. at 1959. On the qualitative differences between dyadic and plural marriage, 
Professor Davis explains that “[p]olygamy’s defining feature—marital multiplicity—
generates specific costs and vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities for exploitative and 
opportunistic behavior. . . . (Of course, for some, multiplicity also generates upsides . . . .)” 
Id. at 1958; see id. at 1989–95 (providing further detail). 
 121. Id. at 2002–32. 
 122. Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Polygamy, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 113, 116 (2013). 
 123. Id. at 145–61, 167–68. 
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plural marriage, Professor Brunson has added his voice to those 
calling for a switch to an individual filing system.124 
Of course, Revenue Ruling 2013-17 cannot address the lack of an 
underlying family law framework for dealing with plural marriage. 
Nor, for that matter, does it address the lack of a tax law framework 
for dealing with plural marriage. Had it done so, the IRS would have 
gone well beyond interpreting the Code. Adopting the alternative 
interpretation would therefore move the tax laws too far, too fast—
entering into uncharted territory that Congress and the states need to 
map before the IRS can address the tax treatment of plural marriage. 
C. Validity of the Alternative Interpretation 
The previous two sections make it clear that the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is both implausible and 
inadvisable because it opens the door to plural marriage. In response 
to these arguments, proponents of that interpretation might argue 
that the IRS never intended to legally recognize plural marriages, as 
evidenced by the lack of any mention of plural marriage in the ruling. 
But the same could be said of evasive marriages—the ruling makes no 
mention of this category of marriages either.125 Nonetheless, 
proponents of the alternative interpretation assert that the IRS must 
have intended to cover evasive marriages in its guidance.126 Such a 
conflicted interpretation of the ruling—reading coverage of one 
unmentioned type of marriage into the ruling while reading another 
unmentioned type of marriage out of the ruling—would be wholly 
untethered from the text. Far beyond mere interpretation, this would 
amount to a rewriting of the ruling—one that undermines the promise 
that the ruling would provide same-sex couples with certainty, clarity, 
and coherent guidance regarding their tax treatment.127 
As a fallback, proponents of the alternative interpretation might 
argue that the IRS had only dyadic marriage in mind when it drafted 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17. This argument is no better because it only 
draws attention to questions regarding the validity of the alternative 
interpretation. As described above, the alternative interpretation’s 
treatment of evasive marriages creates what is, in essence, a federal 
law of marriage that stands apart from state law by overriding 
 
 124. Id. at 149, 161–68. 
 125. See supra Part I. 
 126. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Lowrey, supra note 8. 
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applicable state laws regarding the validity of marriages. To argue 
that couples who enter into these marriages may only have a single, 
dyadic marriage recognized for federal tax purposes—when these 
couples might, in fact, enter into a series of dyadic same-sex marriages 
because each of the dyadic marriages is void under state law—would 
merely impose a federal restriction on a category of federal tax 
marriages. 
If the IRS were to embrace the alternative interpretation, 
taxpayers would very likely challenge it. These challenges could come 
from same-sex couples wishing to enter into plural tax marriages (if 
the IRS refuses them recognition), serially monogamous same-sex 
couples who wish to be freed from adverse consequences of the 
alternative interpretation, or, as I have explained elsewhere, from 
same-sex couples in evasive marriages that have broken down and 
who now find themselves trapped indefinitely in the highly 
disadvantageous married filing separately tax status because they are 
unable to sever their marital relationship under state or federal law.128 
As discussed below, when challenged, the alternative interpretation is 
unlikely to withstand scrutiny because of a combination of its 
implausibility, its inadvisability, and its creation of a federal tax law of 
marriage. Both litigation challenging the alternative interpretation 
and any ruling striking down that interpretation would serve only to 
darken the cloud of tax uncertainty hanging over same-sex couples 
post-Windsor.129 
1.  Deference to Revenue Rulings 
According to the Treasury Regulations, “[a] Revenue Ruling is 
an official interpretation by the [IRS] that has been published in the 
Internal Revenue Bulletin. Revenue Rulings . . . are published for the 
information and guidance of taxpayers, [IRS] officials, and others 
concerned.”130 The purpose of publishing revenue rulings is “to 
promote correct and uniform application of the tax laws by [IRS] 
employees and to assist taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary 
compliance by informing [IRS] personnel and the public of National 
Office interpretations.”131 Although it is intended that taxpayers will 
 
 128. Infanti, supra note 7, at 122–23. 
 129. E.g., id. at 120–22. 
 130. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as amended in 1987); see Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-
1 C.B. 814. 
 131. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1987). 
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rely upon revenue rulings in determining their tax liability, revenue 
rulings “do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department 
Regulations.”132 
It is unclear precisely what level of deference, if any, should be 
afforded to revenue rulings. Conventional wisdom holds that the high 
level of deference afforded to agency action under Chevron, USA, 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc.133 is inappropriate for 
revenue rulings and that the lower level of deference afforded under 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.134 is more appropriate.135 In contrast, Kristin 
Hickman has argued that revenue rulings are eligible for Chevron 
deference because they can trigger the imposition of penalties and, 
therefore, have the force of law.136 However, Professor Hickman has 
further argued that courts should nonetheless invalidate revenue 
rulings because the IRS issues them without satisfying the notice-and-
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.137 
Accepting Professor Hickman’s analysis, Revenue Ruling 2013-
17 should be invalidated in its entirety because the IRS failed to 
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act when issuing the 
ruling. As discussed below, even following the conventional wisdom 
and applying Skidmore deference, the alternative interpretation 
should still be afforded no deference and should be rejected. 
Whichever approach is taken, the result will be to compound the 
uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples post-
Windsor. 
 
 132. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d)–(e). 
 133. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 134. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 135. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (holding that when a statute is silent or ambiguous on 
the question to be addressed, the court will not impose its own construction of the statute 
if the agency has adopted a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
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2.  Skidmore Analysis 
Under Skidmore, agency interpretations that are 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do 
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. 
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.138 
More recently, the Supreme Court, citing Skidmore, stated that 
“[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own 
statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts 
have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, 
formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the 
agency’s position.”139 Professor Hickman, writing with Matthew 
Krueger, has helpfully suggested that these factors should be 
balanced with the overarching goals of Skidmore in mind; namely, 
“Skidmore’s factors should . . . be understood as ferreting out two 
things: first, the extent to which agencies have deliberately employed 
their superior expertise and resources in evaluating the statutory 
ambiguity at hand; and second, the potential for arbitrariness in 
agency action.”140 
Bearing this in mind, the alternative interpretation of Revenue 
Ruling 2013-17 should be afforded no deference under Skidmore 
because it smacks more of arbitrariness than of a reasoned 
application of agency expertise. It cannot be argued that the 
alternative interpretation demonstrates thoroughness of 
consideration or a high degree of care on the part of the IRS. As 
discussed above, it is unclear whether the IRS intended to cover 
evasive marriages in the ruling or even whether the IRS understood 
that this category of marriages exists at all.141 How can the IRS be said 
to have engaged in a reasoned application of its expertise with regard 
to a position that was not clearly articulated and, to date, has only 
been inferred by commentators and others interpreting ambiguous 
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language in the ruling? This is an especially difficult task when, in 
stark contrast, the IRS clearly articulated its position regarding 
migratory marriages, took care in explaining that position, and 
provided a reasoned justification of its choice of a place of celebration 
rule on administrability grounds.142 
The alternative interpretation also lacks any claim to consistency 
with earlier IRS pronouncements. The IRS cites its earlier position in 
Revenue Ruling 58-66 as evidence of a consistent position regarding 
the determination of a marriage’s validity for federal tax purposes; 
however, as explained above, Revenue Ruling 58-66 did not address 
the treatment of evasive marriages.143 Rather, it does no more than 
lend support to the argument that the IRS has taken a consistent 
approach in dealing with the separate question of how to determine 
the validity of migratory marriages.144 
Finally, the alternative interpretation lacks the power of 
persuasion. As discussed above, the alternative interpretation 
essentially creates a federal tax law of marriage—a law that would 
embrace the recognition of plural marriage for federal tax purposes.145 
Aside from an anomalous Second Circuit decision concerning the 
validity of an ex parte divorce (which the IRS has declined to 
follow),146 the IRS and the courts have consistently taken the view 
that, for federal tax purposes, questions of marital status are 
determined under state law.147 Indeed, in specifically rejecting the 
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Second Circuit’s position, the Ninth Circuit emphasized some of the 
problems associated with adopting a federal tax law of marriage: 
To provide a federal tax law of marriage would create greater 
confusion in divorce courts than now exists. Some individuals 
would be validly married for all purposes except federal taxes, 
and others validly married for federal tax purposes only. 
Marriage is peculiarly a creature of state law and we 
reaffirm . . . that state law governs.148 
As the discussion in Part II above amply demonstrates, the Ninth 
Circuit was, if anything, understating the potential problems and 
confusion created by a federal tax law of marriage. Under the 
alternative interpretation, marriages could be recognized for federal 
tax purposes when actually void under state law. Because of the 
invalidity of these marriages under state law, additional marriages 
could then be entered into for federal tax purposes, whether 
purposefully or inadvertently. When the relevant state ban on same-
sex marriage eventually falls, all of these marriages might then be 
recognized under state law as well, but either the additional marriages 
or the first marriage would likely be invalidated under state law to 
avoid a bigamous result—even though there might not be a 
corresponding termination of the marriage for federal tax purposes 
(or, if there is, the periods during which the various marriages would 
be legally recognized under state law might not match the periods 
during which those same marriages would be legally recognized for 
federal tax purposes). Furthermore, those taking advantage of this 
novel federal tax law of marriage might actually risk criminal 
prosecution for bigamy under state law following the fall of the state 
ban on same-sex marriage. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s observation that “[m]arriage is 
peculiarly a creature of state law”149 highlights an additional problem 
with the alternative interpretation—namely, the federalism concerns 
that it raises. The alternative interpretation would create a federal tax 
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law of marriage that is both independent of and, by recognizing plural 
marriage, moves far beyond state marriage laws. The majority in 
United States v. Windsor was suspicious of DOMA’s uniform federal 
definition of marriage because it flatly denied recognition to 
marriages that were valid under state law.150 Of course, the alternative 
interpretation is not motivated by anti-gay animus in the way that 
DOMA was.151 But, in the case of evasive marriages, the alternative 
interpretation would directly interfere with a state’s ability to 
determine the circumstances under which its own residents may 
marry, just as DOMA did.152 Courts may eventually declare individual 
(and hopefully, all) state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional; 
however, it is beyond the IRS’s authority to circumvent the legal 
process for reaching these decisions by creating a federal tax law of 
marriage that overrides and overleaps state law. 
Unfortunately, a concomitant of these federalism concerns is 
tangible harm to same-sex couples. As I have explained elsewhere, 
same-sex couples would be adversely affected by the alternative 
interpretation if they find themselves trapped in a federal tax 
marriage with no way out after the relationship breaks down or when 
they are forced to deal with the complexities (and increased risk of 
audit) stemming from inconsistent federal and state tax treatment of 
their relationships while those relationships remain intact.153 The 
alternative interpretation would also exacerbate class-based 
inequities within states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage, as 
only those with the means to “evade” same-sex marriage bans would 
have access to marriage for federal tax purposes.154 Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, if plural marriage were recognized for federal tax 
purposes, the alternative interpretation could expose the parties to 
marriages intended to take advantage of plural marriage to criminal 
sanctions under state law when the relevant state bans on same-sex 
marriage are repealed or declared unconstitutional and legal 
recognition is applied retroactively. 
For all of these reasons, courts would owe no deference to the 
alternative interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17. Indeed, given 
its lack of persuasive power, courts entertaining challenges to the 
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alternative interpretation would likely reject it. While legal challenges 
to the alternative interpretation were pending, the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the tax treatment of same-sex couples would 
naturally rise. Following the invalidation of the alternative 
interpretation, that uncertainty level would remain high because 
same-sex couples in evasive marriages would return to the status quo 
pre-Windsor, when the courts and the IRS provided same-sex couples 
essentially no guidance on the tax treatment of their relationships.155 
As I have explained elsewhere, deferring to state choice-of-law 
rules on questions of marital status is no panacea either, because that 
would have its own set of negative impacts on same-sex couples.156 
The point of my work in this area is not to advocate one or another 
set of rules that privilege certain marriages over others for federal tax 
purposes. Instead, the point of my work is to demonstrate the 
complexities and problems entailed by the choice in the tax laws to 
privilege one form of relationship (i.e., marriage) over all others. The 
problems entailed by this choice have long been known to tax 
academics.157 The evolving legal landscape for recognizing same-sex 
relationships simply provides an opportunity to make these problems 
salient to a wider audience. Hopefully, we can seize this opportunity 
to move away from a discussion of how best to bring same-sex 
couples into the privileged fold of marriage and toward a 
conversation about how to achieve a tax system that respects all 
relationships equally.158 
CONCLUSION 
Revenue Ruling 2013-17 has failed to deliver on the promise to 
same-sex couples of “certainty and clear, coherent tax-filing 
guidance.”159 The ruling does not address—nor does it seem to fully 
appreciate—the complexities created by the intersection of mobility 
with the patchwork of state relationship recognition laws. Resulting 
ambiguity in the ruling has created the space for commentators to 
offer an interpretation of this ruling that would immediately expand 
the number of same-sex couples who could be treated as married for 
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federal tax purposes far beyond those married and residing in (or who 
formerly resided in) states that permit same-sex couples to marry. 
In addition to having potential negative effects on same-sex 
couples, this interpretation would open the door to legally 
recognizing plural marriage for federal tax purposes. From all 
appearances, it seems that this door was inadvertently left ajar rather 
than purposefully held open. The failure of the alternative 
interpretation to demonstrate any power to persuade is testament to 
the accidental nature of this radical expansion of marriage’s 
privileged circle. However salutary it might be to expand the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships and to break the hold that 
conventional marriage has had on the federal tax laws, the alternative 
interpretation of Revenue Ruling 2013-17 is not the appropriate 
means of accomplishing these ends. 
 
